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INTRODUCTION
The illegal animal trade has reached epic proportions in recent
years. Illegal animal trafficking is the third largest illegal business in the
world, closely following the drug and weapon trade.1 It is a twenty billion
dollar international business that has practically doubled over the last fif-
teen years.2 There is a steep market for these animals and animal parts,
* J.D. candidate 2010, William & Mary School of Law. B.A. History, University of
Maryland, 2006. I would like to thank my family for their support and encouragement
and especially my husband, Daniel Izzo, and father, Daniel Brewer, for their feedback
and advice. I would also like to thank the editorial staff of this journal for their efforts.
1 Dener Giovanni, Taking Animal Trafficking Out of the Shadows, INNOVATION: TECH.
GLOBALIZATION & GOVERNANCE, Spring 2006, at 25, 25.
2 Id.
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and the species traded are often already endangered.3 The conditions
during transport are deplorable, with three out of four animals dying in
transit.4 The magnitude and rapid growth of the illegal animal traffick-
ing business makes it clear that something must be done to protect
these resources, biodiversity, and wildlife for future generations before
it is too late.5
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”),6 signed in 1973, was the first interna-
tional cooperative effort to regulate the illicit animal trade in order “to
safeguard certain species from over-exploitation.”7 At the time, many con-
servationists called CITES the “Magna Charta for Wildlife,” which was
both a “conservation and trade instrument” that protected species from
desecration.8 Since CITES’ inception, many have criticized the agreement
and questioned its effectiveness.9 This is mainly because of CITES’ lack
of adequate enforcement and authority.10
In 2005, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (“IFAW”) re-
leased a study revealing the extent of the illicit business on the internet.11
3 See TRAFFIC—Wildlife Trade, http://www.traffic.org/trade/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
4 Francesca Colombo, Animal Trafficking—Cruel Billion-Dollar Business, TERRAAMERICA,
Sept. 6, 2003, http://www.tierramerica.net/english/2003/0901/iarticulo.shtml.
5 See What is CITES?, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml (last visited Mar. 16,
2010); see also TRAFFIC—Wildlife Trade, supra note 3 (discussing the problem of over-
exploitation). Overexploitation can be destructive, even causing the extinction of a species,
and must be avoided. World Wildlife Fund, Problems: Unsustainable and Illegal Wildlife
Trade, http://www.panda.org/about_our_earth/species/about_species/problems/illegal_trade/
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010). The illegal wildlife trade not only affects an animal’s livelihood,
however, but our own as well. Id. Many communities depend on local wildlife for fuel,
food, or medicines. Id. The entire world has a stake in curtailing the illegal wildlife trade,
both morally and practically.
6 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
text.shtml#texttop [hereinafter CITES].
7 What is CITES?, supra note 5.
8 Peter H. Sand, Whither CITES? The Evolution of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of
Trade and Environment, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29, 34 (1997).
9 See Laura H. Kosloff & Mark Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species: No Carrot, But Where’s the Stick?, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10222 (1987);
Jonathan P. Kazmar, Note, The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade: Biological
Genocide?, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 112–13 (2000); Mara E. Zimmerman,
Note, The Black Market for Wildlife: Combating Transnational Organized Crime in the
Illegal Wildlife Trade, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1657, 1666 (2003).
10 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1660; Kazmar, supra note 9, at 112–13; Kosloff & Trexler,
supra note 9, at 10228.
11 See Int’l Fund for Animal, CAUGHT IN THE WEB: WILDLIFE TRADE ON THE INTERNET
(2005), available at http://www.politics.co.uk/Microsites2/364355/graphics/wildlifetrade
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Some of these transactions are made privately through websites, but IFAW
located many traders who advertise products as well.12 The Council of
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime13 is an international agreement that
attempts to harmonize cybercrime laws, because many cybercrimes are
transnational.14 CITES should be improved to include the evolution of
animal trafficking as a cybercrime by including some of the principles set
forth in the Convention on Cybercrime.
TRAFFIC, a wildlife trade monitoring network, warned the EU that
its wildlife was particularly vulnerable because of the different enforcement
plans of the twenty-seven member states.15 In 2007, the EU launched an
Action Plan16 “to improve wildlife trade enforcement within the EU.”17 The
.pdf [hereinafter CAUGHT IN THE WEB]. Caught in the Web, however, was not IFAW’s first
study on online wildlife trade. See Int’l Fund for Animal, ELEPHANTS ON HIGH STREET
(2004), available at http://www.ifaw.org/Publications/Program_Publications/Elephants/
asset_upload_file236_12046.pdf. This study focused mainly on the sale of ivory in the
United Kingdom, both on the internet and in local markets. Id. at executive summary.
Although the 2004 study did discuss the online trade, it did not become the illuminating
news splash on the extent of the wildlife trade on the internet that Caught in the Web
would be one year later. Compare Helen Johnstone, Antiques Markets Across Britain
‘Awash’ with Illegal Ivory Despite International Trade Ban, INDEP., Mar. 12, 2004, available
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/antiques-markets-across-britain-awash
-with-illegal-ivory-despite-international-trade-ban-566038.html (focusing solely on the
implication of online ivory sales as seen in Elephants on High Street), with Endangered
Wildlife Trafficked via eBay, Other Online Markets International Fund for Animal Welfare,
MONGABAY.COM, Aug. 16, 2005, http://news.mongabay.com/2005/0816-ifaw.html (noting
the evolution of the cyber black market on several species and the problems therein, as
reported in Caught in the Web) [hereinafter Endangered Wildlife Trafficked], and Cyber
Black Market Dims Outlook for Endangered Species Survival, ENVT’L NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 16, 2005 (on file with author) (giving an in-depth summary of the report and the
prominence of online trade as seen in Caught in the Web).
12 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 3.
13 The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No. 185, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm [hereinafter Convention
on Cybercrime].
14 See News Release, Bus. Software Alliance, BSA Applauds US Senate Passage of
Cybercrime Convention (Aug. 4, 2006), http://w3.bsa.org/eupolicy/press/newsreleases/
Cybercrime-Convention.cfm; see also Ted Samson, Critics Clash Over Cybercrime
Convention, INFO. TECH., Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.infoworld.com/t/security/critics-clash
-over-cybercrime-convention-084.
15 Caroline Davies, EU Criticised over Animal Imports, TELEGRAPH, June 1, 2007, available
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/main.jhtml?xml=/earth/2007/06/01/eatrade01.xml.
16 Commission Recommendation: identifying a set of actions for the enforcement of Council
Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating
trade therein, 13 June 2007, 2007 O.J. (L159) 45, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_159/l_15920070620en00450047.pdf [hereinafter EU Action Plan].
17 TRAFFIC, European Union (EU) Wildlife Trade Initiative, http://www.traffic.org/
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Action Plan represents an important step towards a universal trans-
national enforcement plan.
Part I of this note explores CITES and other international initia-
tives to stop the illegal wildlife trade and discusses the problems with these
programs. Part II reveals the emergence of the trade as a cybercrime and
argues that this materialization necessitates a more rigorous enforcement
plan. Part III examines the new EU Action Plan as an example of a more
united and robust program. Part IV suggests improvements to CITES that
are chiefly modeled after the EU Action Plan’s principles and tactics.
Finally, this note concludes by arguing the only successful way to
combat the international illicit animal trade is by building a joint
international effort.
I. CITES AND THE PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Organization and History of CITES
Although some may doubt CITES’ effectiveness, it is clear that
its international acceptance has grown. When CITES was finally imple-
mented on March 3, 1973, eighty countries had signed on.18 Currently,
175 countries around the world are Parties to CITES, including the United
States, Brazil, China, United Kingdom, and France.19
The organization of CITES is relatively straightforward. The
member parties meet every two years at a Conference of Parties (“CoP”)
to discuss the effectiveness of CITES’ conservation efforts and recommend
improvements, review and adopt new policies, and consider administrative
proposals such as budget concerns.20 CITES provides for a Secretariat who
works in an advisory, supervisory, and administrative capacity to ensure
the effectiveness of CITES by monitoring each party’s compliance with
CITES policies, preparing annual reports for each party detailing the cur-
rent implementation efforts of CITES, making policy recommendations,
and performing other managerial functions.21 CITES also consists of three
eu-wildlife-trade/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
18 What is CITES?, supra note 5.
19 See CITES, Member Countries, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.shtml (last
visited Mar. 16, 2010).
20 CITES, supra note 6, at art. 11; Conference of Parties, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
CoP.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
21 CITES, supra note 6, at art. 12; The CITES Secretariat, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
sec/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
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committees whose members represent each of the world’s regions and
advise the Secretariat with policy and scientific recommendations.22
CITES provides a list of the species that are restricted in trade glob-
ally.23 It lists the animals protected by the agreement in three Appendices,
according to the extent of protection they are given.24 At the Conference
of Parties, amendments to the Appendices are typically considered.25
The first Appendix includes all species “threatened with extinc-
tion.”26 CITES mandates any trade with these species must be subject to
“particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their sur-
vival and must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances.”27 The
African elephant (Loxodonta Africana), for example, is primarily consid-
ered a species threatened with extinction and is in the first Appendix.28
The second Appendix includes “all species which although not nec-
essarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in
specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation.”29 Trade of these
specimens must be restricted so as to effectively prevent the species from
being presently threatened with extinction.30 Seahorses (Hippocampus),
for example, are considered species which may be threatened with extinc-
tion under the second Appendix.31
The third Appendix includes all species which “any Party identifies
as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of
preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of
other Parties in the control of trade.”32 This Appendix changes frequently
22 See Standing Committee, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/SC.shtml (last visited Mar. 16,
2010); see also Animals and Plants Committees, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/AC_PC.shtml
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010); see also CITES res. 11.1, 11th Conf. (2000), available at http://
www.cites.org/eng/res/11/11-01R14.shtml (the formal resolution detailing the roles of the
committees).
23 See CITES, supra note 6, at art. 2.
24 See id.
25 Id. at art. 11; Conference of Parties, supra note 20.
26 CITES, supra note 6, at art. 2.
27 Id. at art. 2; see also id. at art. 3 (noting the specific regulations concerning the trade of
these species).
28 Id. at app. 1. Elephants in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, however,
are considered Appendix II animals. See id. at app. 2.
29 Id. at art. 2.
30 Id.; see also id. at art. 4 (stating the specific regulations concerning the trade of these
species).
31 Id. at app. 2.
32 CITES, supra note 6, at art. 2; see also id. at art. 5 (the specific regulations on the trade
of these species).
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at the request of member parties to the Secretariat.33 As of January 2010,
the Canadian Walrus (Odobenus rosmarus), for example, is considered
a third Appendix species.34
B. Problems with Enforcement of CITES
One of the main problems with CITES is that the treaty has no
authority to impose criminal penalties on its own.35 Although CITES
provides guidelines to member states for implementing policies, CITES
has no power to force nations to pass unified legislation.36 And although
CITES monitors the member states for conformity with the treaty, the
Secretariat cannot effectively sanction countries that are non-compliant.37
An international cooperative must be created that holds more authority
to enact policies.
Although CITES is an international treaty, it does little to foster
actual international cooperation. Because CITES has no overarching
authority, each state must enact their own laws.38 This means that many
of the policies have radically different penalties and encourage traders to
make transactions in one country over another.39 “This not only defeats
the purpose of combating organized crime in the illegal wildlife trade, but
encourages the continuous spread of organized crime because groups will
keep moving to and operating from countries that do not have adequate
wildlife criminal legislation or extradition policies.”40 CITES also has no
provision mandating that the countries allow extradition if cross-border
crimes are committed.41 International cooperation between the states,
especially among countries who share borders, is essential to combating
wildlife crime because so many wildlife crimes are transnational.42 CITES,
33 See id. at art. 16.
34 Id. at app. 3.
35 See Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679–82; see also Kazmar, supra note 9, at 110.
36 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1665; Kazmar, supra note 9, at 110–13.
37 Kazmar, supra note 9, at 112–13.
38 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1665–66; Kazmar, supra note 9, at 110–11.
39 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1680.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1679–80. For more information on the possibility of extradition, see infra text
accompanying notes 86–90 (on the Convention on Cybercrime and its provision supporting
extradition).
42 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1665–69, 81 (suggesting that wildlife criminal rings are
often transnational and that international cooperation between the member states of
CITES is essential).
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therefore, fails to encourage adequate collaboration between its member
states to combat wildlife crime.
Lastly, CITES fails to provide sufficient financial support to coun-
tries in order for them to independently combat wildlife crime in an effi-
cient manner. Although CITES allows non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”), like the World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”), to give financial resources
to CITES,43 the treaty continues to be criticized for not doing enough to
financially assist developing countries.44
Although CITES is an important first step in the fight against wild-
life crime, it is critically flawed. CITES does not have enough authority
to enact its own legislation and no power to sanction countries that are not
enacting appropriate legislation. CITES also does not adequately foster
and encourage international cooperation, which weakens the world’s ability
to aptly fight transnational wildlife crime. Finally, the treaty does not
sufficiently provide developing countries with the resources to effectively
combat illegal animal trafficking. International legislation must be enacted
to overcome these obstacles and provide a surmountable possibility of
successful wildlife protection.
II. ANIMAL TRAFFICKING AS A CYBERCRIME
As criminals become more sophisticated and internet use becomes
more prominent, animal trafficking has emerged as a significant cyber-
crime. The internet poses a new significant threat to the protection of ani-
mal trafficking.45 Although animals are still being exploited in a traditional
sense through poaching,46 traffickers are now utilizing the internet’s many
tools to do their dirty business.47 The internet provides the “anonymity
43 Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 9, at 10225; Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1664. NGOs
provide substantial financing and participate in the COPs. See Kosloff & Trexler, supra
note 9, at 10225–26 (discussing NGOs and how they have supported CITES in the past);
see also, e.g., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SPECIES FACT SHEET: ILLEGAL AND UNSUSTAINABLE
WILDLIFE TRADE 1–4 (2006), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wildlife_trade
_factsheet2006.pdf (describing how WWF helps support CITES and the enforcement of
international laws).
44 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682–83; see also infra text accompanying notes 158–69
(discussion of CITES’ Trust Fund and its inadequacies).
45 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at ii.
46 See Sharon Begley, Extinction Trade: Endangered Animals are the New Blood Diamonds
as Militias and Warlords Use Poaching to Fund Death, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2008, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/117875 (describing the prevalence of African militia
poaching).
47 Elizabeth A. Beardsley, Poachers with PCs: The United States’ Potential Obligations
and Ability to Enforce Endangered Wildlife Trading Prohibitions against Foreign Traders
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and global reach” that ultimately frustrates wildlife protection efforts.48
Law enforcement agencies now must fight criminals from all over the world
who may or may not be easily identifiable. The problems of combating
cybercrimes have now been extended to the crime of animal trafficking.
A. The History of Online Animal Trade
The groundbreaking 2005 IFAW study on online animal trafficking
revealed the extent of the problem to the world.49 News outlets around
the world reported the results overnight, and everything people thought
they knew about animal trafficking changed.50
IFAW began its study with a comprehensive one-week investigation
of the extent of wildlife trade on the internet.51 IFAW “found over 9,000
wild animal products and specimens and live wild animals for sale, pre-
dominantly from species protected by law.”52 “The majority of these were
offered for sale by . . . individuals,” either privately or through a website.53
It is impossible to know just how many illegal transactions are
being made online, since the investigation only consisted of English-
language sites and focused mainly on five areas: live primates; elephant
products; turtle and tortoiseshell products; other reptile products; and
wild cat products.54 IFAW found 5527 elephant products on the internet
including “skin/leather products such as boots, wallets, purses, footwear
and bags; bone products such as carvings, jewellery [sic], a Mah-jong set
and fans; and ivory products such as jewellery [sic], boxes, chess sets, orna-
ments, and expensive sculptures . . .”55 The fact that 146 live primates sold
were on fifteen websites is horrifying; a transaction that is either entirely
Who Advertise on eBay, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 6–7 (2006). “[A] recent criminal
justice study of the illegal wildlife market in South Africa and Namibia reported that
‘traffickers relied on modern communications technology of email and Internet web sites
to trade their stolen goods.’ ” Id. at 6.
48 Id. at 7; see also CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at ii.
49 See generally CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11; see also Endangered Wildlife
Trafficked via eBay, supra note 11; Cyber Black Market Dims Outlook for Endangered
Species Survival, supra note 11.
50 See Endangered Wildlife Trafficked Via eBay, supra note 11; see also Cyber Black Market
Dims Outlook for Endangered Species Survival, supra note 11.
51 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 3.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.; Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, BIDDING FOR EXTINCTION 1 (2007), available at http://
www.ifaw.org/Publications/Program_Publications/Wildlife_Trade/Campaign_Scientific
_Publications/asset_upload_file64_12456.pdf [hereinafter BIDDING FOR EXTINCTION].
55 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 3.
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illegal or strictly restricted.56 526 turtle and tortoiseshell products were
being sold on the internet, including websites such as eBay.57 2630 reptile
products, including both live animals such as crocodiles and reptile cloth-
ing accessories, were being sold by fifteen internet traders.58 IFAW also
found 239 live wild cat specimens and wild cat products, such as claws and
skulls, on the internet.59 The entire extent of wildlife trade on the
internet must be staggering if this snapshot is any indicator.60
eBay in particular has been widely criticized recently over listings
of ivory on their website.61 After IFAW’s Caught in the Web was published,
IFAW met with eBay and recommended that the website restrict all sales
of wildlife and wildlife products on their sites.62 Although some eBay sites,
like Germany eBay, were willing to crack down on illegal wildlife trade,
IFAW followed the discussions with another investigatory study focusing
solely on eBay transactions.63 The one-week investigation, in 2007, focused
on eBay websites in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.64 IFAW found over 2000 list-
ings for ivory products and only 134 of the listings were “potentially fully
compliant” with eBay’s rules and CITES.65 Over ninety percent of the ivory
listings breached eBay’s listed policy by either claiming to be antique but
offering no proof of age or not referencing eBay policy or age at all.66
There is no question that IFAW’s investigations have affected eBay
policy. Less than a month after Bidding for Extinction was published, eBay
banned the cross-border sale of ivory on its sites.67 Some critics, however,
questioned whether eBay was doing enough to stop illegal ivory sales.68
56 Id.
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id.
60 BIDDING FOR EXTINCTION, supra note 54, at 1 (“Clearly, the investigation uncovered
merely the tip of an enormous iceberg.”).
61 See Larry Greenemeier, Is EBay Doing Enough to Stop Illegal Ivory Sales on Its Site?,
SCI. AM., June 5, 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=is-ebay-doing
-enough. See generally BIDDING FOR EXTINCTION, supra note 54.
62 BIDDING FOR EXTINCTION, supra note 54, at 1.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 4.
65 Id. at 14.
66 Id. at 4, 14; Arthur Max, eBay Banning Cross-Border Sales of Ivory, USA TODAY, June 5,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-06-05-ebay-ivory-ban_N.htm.
67 Max, supra note 66.
68 See Greenemeier, supra note 61; Max, supra note 66 (noting that animal welfare critics
argue that eBay will eventually be forced to stop all ivory trade).
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In May 2008, over a year after their investigation for Bidding for
Extinction, IFAW found over 600 listings for elephant ivory on eBay.69 This
was after eBay’s ban on cross-border ivory sales.70 Greenemeier also did
an investigation in June of 2008 and found 306 elephant ivory items for
sale on eBay.71 Again, several of the sellers claimed that the items were
antique or pre-ban, most offered no proof to corroborate their claims.72
Although eBay had implemented more progressive policies, they were
poorly enforced and relatively ineffective.73
The most recent IFAW investigative study in 2008, Killing With
Keystrokes, concluded that eBay alone was responsible for almost two-
thirds of online animal trafficking despite its 2007 report Bidding for
Extinction.74 Specifically, eBay was responsible for eighty percent of all
elephant ivory sales.75 Additionally, eleven percent of the ivory sales explic-
itly offered international shipping, despite the cross-border ban.76 IFAW
also called for a worldwide ban on ivory sales.77
IFAW’s investigation finally caused eBay to make a radical policy
decision. Hours before the public release of Killing With Keystrokes, eBay
announced a complete ban on ivory sales on its sites worldwide beginning
January 1, 2009.78 IFAW also urged other online trading websites to
follow suit.79
69 Greenemeier, supra note 61. IFAW reported that several of the ads claimed to be pre-
ban. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See id.
74 INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, KILLING WITH KEYSTROKES 13 (2008), http://www.ifaw
.org/Publications/Program_Publications/Wildlife_Trade/Campaign_Scientific_Publications/
asset_upload_file848_49629.pdf; Press Release, Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, eBay
Announces Ivory Ban in Wake of IFAW Report (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.ifaw.org/
ifaw_united_states/media_center/press_releases/10_20_2008_49638.phpt.
75 KILLING WITH KEYSTROKES, supra note 74, at 11.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 17–18.
78 Press Release, Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, supra note 74. A recent search for elephant
ivory only found one advertisement selling a hand-carved ivory toothpick holder. Posting
of Kelly45 to www.ebay.com (Jan. 27, 2010) (on file with author). Although the search
revealed fifty-nine items, most of these were “faux ivory” or simply ivory-colored. Search
of “Elephant Ivory,” eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last performed Jan. 28, 2010). This is
a large improvement over searches done in 2008. See Greenemeier, supra note 61 (finding
over 300 listings in June 2008).
79 Press Release, Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, supra note 74.
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It is important to remember that ivory is not the only wildlife
product that needs to be restricted. On eBay.com, you can buy real sea-
horses, listed under the second Appendix of CITES.80 Some sellers are
only offering tiny seahorses for less than $2.00 each,81 while others sell
large seahorses for up to $35.00.82 Although seahorses are not yet endan-
gered, they are being threatened, in part, because of sales like these.83
It is important, however, to note that eBay is not the only website
that engages in the illicit trade.84 Private online transactions on lesser
known sites are also problematic and cannot be ignored.
On exoticanimalsforsale.net, for example, you can buy various exotic
animals.85 For example, this author found several ads for primates,86 which
80 Search of “Real Seahorses,” eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last performed Jan. 26, 2009)
(on file with author); CITES, supra note 6, at app. 2. This search resulted in over forty
postings for dried seahorses. Search of “Real Seahorses,” supra.
81 See, e.g., Posting of kawagner101 to www.ebay.com (Jan. 27, 2010) (on file with author)
(noting the seahorses are “real” and “sealife.”).
82 See, e.g., Posting of thaiseashell to www.ebay.com (Jan. 27, 2010) (on file with author)
(noting the seahorse was taken from the Andaman Sea and that the starting bid was
$34.99).
83 Seahorses Breeding at London Aquarium, http://www.londonaquarium.co.uk/node/110
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) “One of the biggest threats comes from the seahorse’s reputation
for possessing magical and healing powers, which have made it a popular ‘cure’ in tradi-
tional Chinese medicine.” Maxine Frith, Revealed: The Illegal Online Animal Trade,
INDEPT. (London), Aug. 16, 2005 at 6, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/revealed
-the-illegal-online-animal-trade-503078.html.
On eBay, a buyer can find “1 LB China Real Sea Horse Seahorse Seashell herb tonic”
for $299.99. See Posting of peterli1981120 to www.ebay.com (Jan. 27, 2010) (on file with
author). The price is much higher than other postings and the risk to seahorse population
is greater. Id. This seller had twenty pounds of seahorses to sell. Compare id. with footnotes
80–82 and accompanying text.
84 See KILLING WITH KEYSTROKES, supra note 74, at 21 (for a specific listing of each website
cited in the report).
85 See Exotic Animals For Sale, http://www.exoticanimalsforsale.net/animalsforsale.asp
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
86 See, e.g., Posting to www.exoticanimalsforsale.net (Dec. 27, 2009) (on file with author)
(selling Capuchins); Posting to www.exoticanimalsforsale.net (Oct. 2, 2009) (on file with
author) (selling a Marmoset for $1500); Posting to www.exoticanimalsforsale.net (Dec. 20,
2009) (on file with author) (selling marmosets, squirrel monkeys, owl monkeys, and
bushbabies).
Some owners negligently blur the line between pet and exotic animal. For example,
one seller on the website notes “[t]his baby Marmoset is diaper trained and, as you can see,
looks pretty spiffy in his little outfits (not included) as well!” Posting to www.exoticanimals
forsale.net (Oct. 23, 2009) (on file with author). Besides ridiculously equating wild animals
to children or dogs, irresponsible owners can be putting themselves and others at risk.
The horrific and tragic chimpanzee attack in 2009 led to an increased awareness of the
dangers of having wild animals for pets. See Andy Newman, Pet Chimp is Shot Dead after
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are usually either wholly illegal to trade or highly restricted.87 You can buy
a Cottontop Tamarin (Saguinus Oedipus) for $3,300 on this site.88 These
Tamarins are listed under Appendix 1.89 The seller negligently makes no
mention of any restrictions on the sale, licenses, or permits for any of the
available animals.90
Research and data should continue to be written, because IFAW’s
past reports have impacted the world’s fundamental thinking about on-
line animal trafficking. After Caught in the Web, the world stood up and
took notice.91 As the criminal enterprises change, more research initia-
tives from NGOs like TRAFFIC and IFAW must continue to keep online
animal trafficking at the forefront of the world’s mind.
B. The Convention on Cybercrime
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime attempts to
address the inherent problems of internet crime over traditional markets.92
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force
in July 2004, is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the
internet, including illegal trade.93 It is open for signature by member states
of the Council of Europe and non-member states.94 As of December 2009,
twenty-six countries have ratified the document, including the United
States, France, and Italy.95 The member states pledge to “pursue, as a
Mauling Woman in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009 at A30, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/americas/17iht-chimp.1.20241928.html (“A 200-pound
pet chimpanzee in Stamford, Connecticut, viciously mauled a woman he had known for
years, leaving her critically injured with much of her face torn away.”); see Joshua Rhett
Miller, Chimpanzee Attack Revives Call for Federal Primate Law, FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 18,
2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,495787,00.html.
87 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 3; see also CITES, supra note 6, at apps. 1–3.
88 Posting to www.exoticanimalsforsale.net (Dec. 20, 2009) (on file with author).
89 CITES, supra note 6, at app. 1.
90 See posting to www.exoticanimalsforsale.net (Dec. 22, 2009) (on file with author).
91 For another example of another report that changed wildlife policy, see infra text
accompanying notes 106–10.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 45–48.
93 Ira Piltz, Internet Law—European Union’s Convention on Cyber Crime (ets no. 185):
First International Treaty on Crimes Committed via the Internet, COMPUTER CRIME RES.
CTR., Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.crime-research.org/news/22.01.2008/3144/.
94 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at art. 36.
95 Member States of the Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). The United
States joined in 2006, and the Convention subsequently went into effect in the United
States on January 1, 2007. Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, Sean McCormack, United
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matter of priority, a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of
society against cybercrime, inter alia, by adopting appropriate legislation
and fostering international cooperation . . . .”96
The Treaty also allows for the extradition of cross-border criminals
even if the two parties do not have a specific treaty allowing for it.97 There
are limits, however, on the extradition agreement.98 First, the party must
be accused of one of the most severe crimes, found in articles 2–11.99 Also,
the crimes must be punishable under the laws of both countries by at least
one year in jail.100 “This Convention provision is an important step in har-
monizing extradition laws between member countries and bringing re-
luctant countries up to date.”101 The provisions encouraging extradition
are an important feature of the treaty because criminals cannot hide from
prosecution in one jurisdiction with more lenient penalties.102
Although the Convention on Cybercrime does not explicitly mention
online animal trafficking, it does encompass online illicit wildlife trade.103
The IFAW considered the convention a potentially effective and coordi-
nated international law tackling online wildlife crimes.104 Proponents of
States Joins Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www
.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/73353.htm.
96 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at pmbl.
97 Id. at art. 24.
98 See id.
99 Id. at art. 24, para. 1.
100 Id.
101 Mike Keyser, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L.
& POL’Y 287, 317 (2003).
102 Id.; President Bush supported the extradition clause for the same reasons saying:
By providing for broad international cooperation in the form of
extradition and mutual legal assistance, the Cybercrime Convention
would remove or minimize legal obstacles to international cooperation
that delay or endanger U.S. investigations and prosecutions of computer-
related crime. As such, it would help deny “safe havens” to criminals,
including terrorists, who can cause damage to U.S. interests from abroad
using computer systems.
Message to Senate Transmitting the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1579 (Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/
2003/November/20031117190405rennefl0.4209101.html.
103 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 16 (calling the Convention “the first international
treaty on crimes committed via the Internet, including illegal trade.”); Convention on
Cybercrime, supra note 13, at art. 14, para. 2 (noting that “except as specifically provided
otherwise in Article 21, each Party shall apply the powers and procedures referred to
in paragraph 1 of this article to . . . other criminal offences committed by means of a
computer system.”).
104 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at 16–17 (when the article was written the
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the Treaty are encouraged by the Convention on Cybercrime’s tough
answer to complex legal and technical international problems concerning
internet crimes, saying “ ‘[C]yber criminals are not limited by borders, and
this treaty will help ensure that law enforcement isn’t either.’ ”105
Many, however, criticized the United States’ ratification of the
Convention of Cybercrime.106 The chief concerns among critics seem to be
the lack of “dual criminality” and alleged United States constitutional vio-
lations.107 Convention supporters, however, argue that the treaty provides
safeguards to prevent the alleged abuses.108
Critics condemn the treaty’s lack of dual criminality.109 Dual crimi-
nality would require that the offense be illegal in both countries before
one country asks for support from the other.110 The Electronic Privacy
Information Center (“EPIC”) argued that the treaty requires “U.S. law
enforcement authorities to cooperate with a foreign police force even when
such an agency is investigating an activity that, while constituting a crime
in their territory, is perfectly legal in the U.S.”111 Critics allege that this
Convention had not been ratified by the UK and, therefore, IFAW cautions that although
the convention had progressive ideas, it has yet to come into force).
105 News Release, Bus. Software Alliance, supra note 14; Samson, supra note 14.
106 Compare Cyber Security Industry Alliance, Council of Europe’s Convention on
Cybercrime: Get the Facts (supporting the Convention and calling it “an important tool
in the global fight against those who seek to disrupt computer networks, misuse sensitive
or private information, or commit traditional crimes using Internet-enabled technologies.”)
(on file with author), with Danny O’Brien, The World’s Worst Internet Laws Sneaking
Through the Senate, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2006/08/worlds-worst-internet-laws-sneaking-through-senate (calling the treaty “invasive”
and a “bad internet law.”), and Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Electric Privacy Info. Center
President, to Chairman Richard G. Lugar & Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations (July 26, 2005), available at http://epic.org/privacy/intl/senateletter
-072605.pdf (arguing the convention “threatens core legal protections, in the United States
Constitution, for persons in the United States.”).
107 Letter from Marc Rotenberg, supra note 106; see also Samson, supra note 14; O’Brien,
supra note 106 (arguing that countries that limit free speech could require U.S. officials
to revoke U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights).
108 Kevin Poulsen, U.S. Defends Cybercrime Treaty, SECURITYFOCUS, Apr. 23, 2004, http://
www.securityfocus.com/news/8529 (noting the Justice Department’s response to critics).
It is important to note that Poulsen may be biased when reporting about internet crimes.
Poulsen was convicted of “mail, wire and computer fraud, as well as obstruction of justice
and sentenced to almost 5 years in prison and forced to pay $56,000 in restitution” in 1994.
Home Security, Most Famous Hackers and Crackers in the World, http://homesecurity
.net/hackers-crackers/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
109 Poulsen, supra note 108; Samson, supra note 14; O’Brien, supra note 106; Letter from
Marc Rotenberg, supra note 106, at 3–4.
110 Letter from Marc Rotenberg, supra note 106, at 3.
111 Id.
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is particularly a concern when another country’s laws limit free speech
or privacy rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.112
The Justice Department countered, however, by arguing that the
treaty protects Americans from abuses of this nature.113 The treaty allows
a country to refuse to cooperate in an investigation if its “essential in-
terests” are threatened by the request and the Justice Department argues
that this clause allows the United States to refuse cooperation if the gov-
ernment believes it is unconstitutional or inappropriate.114 In fact, the
United States did refuse to sign a protocol criminalizing the distribution
or publication of anything online that is racist or xenophobic in nature.115
Although the Protocol is on the surface admirable, the Justice Department
was concerned that it abridged the right to free speech.116 The Protocol,
being separate from the main treaty, allows for any member state to refuse
to sign the additional protocol, but still endorse the main treaty.117
There has been little evidence to support the proposition that
the Convention on Cybercrime will lead to flagrant violations of the U.S.
Constitution. There have been no cases in the U.S. prosecuting U.S. citizens
under the Convention, let alone highly publicized abuses of justice.118
112 Samson, supra note 14; O’Brien, supra note 106.
113 Poulsen, supra note 108.
114 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at art. 27, para. 4; Poulsen, supra note 108.
115 See Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime ch. 1, Jan. 28, 2003, ETS No.
189; Declan McCullagh, U.S. Won’t Support Net “Hate Speech” Ban, ZDNET, Nov. 15,
2002, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-126319.html; United States Department of
Justice, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime—Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2010) [hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime FAQs].
116 McCullagh, supra note 115; Convention on Cybercrime FAQs, supra note 115.
117 Convention on Cybercrime FAQs, supra note 115; Additional Protocol to the Convention
on Cybercrime, supra note 115, at art. 9.
118 This author has been unable to find any U.S. prosecutions or extraditions under the
Convention on Cybercrime. Search of “Convention on Cybercrime” or “ETS No. 185,”
LexisNexis, All Federal and State Cases, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last performed Jan. 19,
2010) (on file with author); Search of “Convention on Cybercrime” or “ETS No. 185,”
Westlaw, All Federal and State Cases, http://www.westlaw.com (last performed Jan. 19,
2010) (on file with author).
If extradition was necessary, the process can take a prohibitively long time. For ex-
ample, Gary McKinnon, the famous British NASA hacker, who allegedly hacked NASA’s
computers in 2001, has still not been extradited under the Convention. Tom Espiner,
Nasa Hacker Defence Vows to Fight On, ZDNET UK, Nov. 27, 2009, http://news.zdnet.co
.uk/security/0,1000000189,39909131,00.htm; Iain Thompson & John Geralds, US Wants
to Extradite UK Hacker, VNUNET.COM, Nov. 13, 2002, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/
news/2120729/wants-extradite-uk-hacker. McKinnon has appealed to several UK courts
to avoid extradition. Tom Espiner, Nasa Hacker Closer to Extradition After CPS Refusal,
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Additionally, the U.S. has shown in the past, with the protocol on xeno-
phobia, that it is unwilling to sacrifice privacy and free speech in the name
of tough cybercrime prosecution. It is premature, therefore, to predict the
doom of liberty.
III. EU ACTION PLAN
In 2007, TRAFFIC published a report, “Opportunity or Threat: The
Role of the European Union in the Global Wildlife Trade,”119 criticizing
the EU’s prominent illegal wildlife trade.120 TRAFFIC estimated that be-
tween 2000–2005 the EU imported “3.4 million lizard skins, 2.9 million
crocodile skins and 3.4 million snake skins” and over a million live rep-
tiles.121 TRAFFIC blamed the EU’s low political awareness of the problem,
the high prices for wildlife, and the low penalties charged by the govern-
ments for its high level of illegal imports.122 TRAFFIC ultimately recom-
mended that the EU adopt a “greater national, regional and interregional
co-ordination” believing that a “coordinated EU wildlife trade enforcement
action plan with identified priorities, and building on growing political
will would considerably strengthen the EU’s response to illegal trade.”123
It is likely this recommendation that led to the EU Action Plan.
The EU Action Plan went into effect on June 13, 2007.124 The
EU Action Plan is comprised of a series of resolutions that condemn the
illegal wildlife and plant trade, stating that it “causes serious damage
ZDNET UK, Feb. 26, 2009, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39619206,00
.htm. So it is possible that if an American is facing extradition or prosecution right now,
that person may not actually be prosecuted for many years. Regardless, this appeal process
is yet another safeguard that an alleged criminal under the convention can utilize to protect
their liberty from the unjustified attacks critics warn about.
119 See MARILYN ENGER & ROB PARRY-JONES, TRAFFIC, OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT: THE
ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE GLOBAL WILDLIFE TRADE (2007), available at
http://www.traffic.org/general-reports/traffic_pub_trade15.pdf [hereinafter OPPORTUNITY
OR THREAT].
120 Davies, supra note 15; EU: Top Global Importer of Wildlife, TRAFFIC, June 1, 2007,
http://www.traffic.org/home/2007/6/1/eu-top-global-importer-of-wildlife.html.
For example, EU seizures of the endangered Egyptian Tortoise constituted thirteen
percent of the animal’s global population left in the wild. Davies, supra note 15; see also
OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119, at 6. The Egyptian Tortoise (Testudo Kleinmanni)
is listed in CITES Appendix 1. OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119, at 13; CITES,
supra note 6, at app. 1.
121 OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119, at 29.
122 Id. at 6.
123 Id.
124 EU Action Plan, supra note 16.
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to wildlife resources, reduces the effectiveness of wildlife management
programs, undermines legal, sustainable trade and threatens sustain-
able development particularly in the developing economies of many pro-
ducing countries.”125 The EU Action Plan focuses on the cooperation
between the twenty-seven EU states.126 The EU Action Plan then makes
recommendations in order to better enforce the policies of CITES and its
EU counterparts.127
The Plan details what individual member states can do to increase
domestic enforcement of wildlife crime.128 The Plan recommends adopting
national policies in order to coordinate increased enforcement as TRAFFIC
ultimately recommended.129 The Plan also seeks to increase the intelli-
gence efforts and cross-border checks among the participating nations.130
The Plan also seeks to increase the enforcement of wildlife crimes by ensur-
ing penalties are a sufficient deterrent.131 The Plan finally acknowledges
the need for increased funding for these programs, especially in develop-
ing countries and wants to ensure that all enforcement agencies are ade-
quately funded and are provided with the necessary personnel, training,
expertise, and equipment.132 It is encouraging that the EU Action Plan
seems to make increased enforcement a priority.133
The Plan makes recommendations for increasing cooperation and
information exchange in order to increase the transnational enforcement
of CITES.134 The Plan creates inter-agency committees to establish the
cooperative national enforcement policies.135 The Plan also ensures that
an Enforcement Group will meet regularly to share relative intelligence
concerning significant trends in illegal trade, seizures, and important court
cases and prosecutions to ensure consistency in the application of the laws
125 Id. at para. I.
126 Id. at para. III.
127 Id. at para. II.
128 See id.
129 Id. at para. II(a); see OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119, at 6, 42.
130 EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. II(g)–(h).
131 Id. at paras. 5–6; see id. at para. III(g) (ensuring consistent penalties among the member
states).
132 Id. at para. III(h)–(i), (m); id. at para. II(b).
133 This is especially important, since it was one of the chief complaints TRAFFIC detailed
in its report. OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119, at 42.
134 EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. III. The Plan encourages collaboration between
all states to combat illegal wildlife trade by interconnecting state policies “with other
regional and sub-regional initiatives.” Id. at para. III(n).
135 Id. at para. III(a).
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between the states.136 In addition, the Plan recognizes the need to help
build up the enforcement tactics in developing countries by providing
assistance to these states with training mechanisms and equipment for
better detection of crimes.137
Lastly, the Plan encourages a close relationship with CITES.
The EU will liaison with CITES to help detect wildlife laws through the
“exchange of information and intelligence.”138 Again, the EU requires the
support of “capacity-building programmes in third [world] countries in
order to improve implementation and enforcement of CITES.”139 The
Plan recognizes the importance of coordination with CITES in order to
encourage better wildlife law enforcement rather than simply an EU-
centered program.
The EU Action Plan is the next step in the effective combat of
illegal wildlife trade.140 The EU CITES Enforcement Group supports the
Action Plan saying, “[g]iving high priority to CITES enforcement is crucial
to combating illegal trade. This EU Action Plan demonstrates the EU’s
commitment to effective enforcement.”141 Importantly, there will be support
for enforcement efforts in developing countries including law enforcement
equipment, training, personnel, and expertise, an “increase[ed] awareness
of illegal wildlife trade,” and adequate funding to support enforcement pro-
grams.142 CITES does not effectively financially support developing coun-
tries to combat the illegal wildlife trade.143 The EU Action Plan effectively
supplements CITES and its programs.
One of the most effective tools that the EU uses is the EU-TWIX.
EU-TWIX, or “EU Trade in Wildlife Information eXchange,” is an intranet
tool, run in conjunction with TRAFFIC, used to “exchange [ ] information
136 Id. at para. III(d); see also id. at para. III(g).
137 Id. at para. III(h); see also id. at para. II(b).
138 Id. at para. III(k).
139 Id. at para. III(m).
140 See Global Push to Tackle International Wildlife Crime, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, June 6,
2007, http://www.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/conservation/species_programme/
species_news/species_news_archive.cfm?105700/Global-push-to-tackle-international
-wildlife-crime; Press Release, World WILDLIFE FUND, CITES: Commercially Traded Species
Big Losers—WWF/TRAFFIC, June 27, 2007, http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/
press/2007/WWFPresitem971.html (noting that CITES officials thought the Action Plan
“was a positive step in the right direction”).
141 Global Push to Tackle International Wildlife Crime, supra note 140.
142 EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. II(b); id. at III(h)–(i), (m); Global Push to Tackle
International Wildlife Crime, supra note 140.
143 See supra Part I.B and accompanying text.
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on wildlife seizures across all twenty-seven member states.”144 The intra-
net is partially funded by the EU Commission and “. . . a joint initiative
of the Belgian Federal Police, Customs and CITES Management Authority,
and TRAFFIC Europe.”145 The database contains information on animals
commonly sought after, seizure methods, prices of wildlife, and other in-
formation helpful to monitor and combat the illicit wildlife trade.146 The
intranet encourages international cooperation by including sharing of
resources, information, training and identification techniques, and ex-
pertise.147 Only designated enforcement officials with access codes can
use the database, so it can remain secure.148 This intranet embodies the
goals and policies put forward by the Action Plan.149 Any international
cooperative should include this intranet or a similar program to help
effectively realize CITES’ goals and policies.
It is difficult to assess the Action Plan’s success at this point.
Although CITES requires each member to make annual and biennial
reports on the implementation of the convention,150 these reports are pre-
dictably backlogged. The latest European Commission Annual Report
available is from 2007.151 Since the Action Plan was implemented in mid-
2007, there is no data available to show the success of the Action Plan on
combating illegal wildlife trade in the EU.152
This is the first step to an international cooperative conservation
plan that has universal enforcement penalties and policies. The Plan’s co-
operation efforts are an exemplary example of international cooperation,
information sharing, and funding that the CITES convention inherently
144 TRAFFIC—EU Wildlife Trade Initiative, http://www.traffic.org/eu-wildlife-trade/ (last
visited Jan. 19, 2010); Global Push to Tackle International Wildlife Crime, supra note
140; see also EUR. UNION TRADE IN WILDLIFE INFO. EXCH., EU-TWIX INFORMATION
LEAFLET, available at http://www.traffic.org/enforcement-reports/traffic_pub_enforce5.pdf
[hereinafter EU-TWIX INFORMATION LEAFLET].
145 EU-TWIX INFORMATION LEAFLET, supra note 144.
146 Id.
147 Id. (noting specific examples on how the countries have been using the intranet and
helping each other).
148 Id. This author, therefore, cannot investigate the actual intranet and its uses.
149 The intranet was actually in place before the EU Action Plan. Global Push to Tackle
International Wildlife Crime, supra note 140 (“The action plan builds on existing initiatives
to combat the increasing illegal wildlife trade . . . include[ing] [the] EU TWIX.”).
150 CITES, supra note 6, at art. XVIII (7)(a)–(b); see also European Commission—Annual
and Biennial Reports, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/cites/reports_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2010).
151 European Commission—Annual and Biennial Reports, supra note 150.
152 See id.
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lacks. With the EU Action Plan still in its infancy, however, it is hard to
tell if it will be successful or not. At the very least, the EU Action Plan re-
veals the possibility of an international cooperative of several countries,
both westernized and third world, working together for the common goal
of wildlife protection.
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Provide Resources For Enforcement Through International Co-
operation and Support
One major problem plaguing CITES is that it lacks both the
financial and subsidiary resources to effectively enforce its provisions.
Third world countries are less likely to have the resources to properly train
enforcement officials, have technological support, and generally finance
the programs necessary to successfully combat wildlife crime.153 Signa-
tory countries that have more resources must be strongly persuaded to
share resources and information and encouraged to provide financial sup-
port to poorer countries. Although the international economy is suffering,
the world must put the environment at the forefront of their policies to
curb the disastrous animal overexploitation.
Although the treaty does allow the Convention of Parties to adopt
financial provisions154 and the treaty has developed a trust fund which
provides the budget for the convention,155 critics argue that CITES is
underfunded and that third world countries, particularly, cannot afford
to implement the programs necessary for it to be effective.156 Poor coun-
tries cannot be expected to implement the expensive programs necessary
to effectively combat wildlife crime on their own and need support from
CITES and other member states.157 CITES must also be able to rely on
153 See Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682 (citing ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE 221
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 2002)).
154 CITES, supra note 6, at art. (3)(a).
155 How Is CITES Financed?, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/fund.shtml (last visited Mar. 16,
2010).
156 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682–83. The EU Action Plan recognizes the need for
additional funding. See also EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at pt. 3(h)–(i), (m) (providing
more assistance to third world countries and other member states).
157 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682–83; John L. Garrison, Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate Over
Sustainable Use, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 389 (1994).
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the funds that are already provided for by the treaty. CITES, and the
member states, are crippled from a lack of resources.
The Trust Fund has been recently criticized as ineffective. The
Trust Fund is made up of contributions from the Parties to the Convention
“based on the United Nations scale of assessment,”158 which is why the
U.S. paid $1,135,359 in 2009 while Saint Kitts and Nevis was responsible
for only $52.159 The first problem is that the Trust Fund only primarily
covers the administrative costs of the Convention and does not provide
funds for countries to finance their policies.160 This leaves very little money
left to help countries implement CITES policies.
The second problem is that $636,498 has not been paid to the Trust
Fund for 2009 as of January 1, 2010, more than ten percent of the 2009
annual budget.161 Additionally, because the U.S. contributes over one-fifth
of the trust fund, the ten percent of unpaid contributions has a larger im-
pact on the Convention’s overall financial outlook.162 Even more unsettling
is that sixteen countries have not paid anything since 1992.163 Iran has
the largest long-term debt, $87,796, almost ten percent of the total unpaid
contributions since 2008.164 The Secretariat alleges that most debts are
the result of a “lack of political will” rather than a “lack of capacity.”165
The Secretariat has little power to force countries to pay their debts
and struggles to collect payments.166 The Secretariat sends requests and
reminders to delinquent countries often without success.167 In the 13th
Conference of Parties, CITES simply “requests all Parties to pay their
158 How is CITES Financed?, supra note 155.
159 CITES, TRUST FUND: STATUS AS OF 28FEBRUARY 2010 (2010), available at http://www
.cites.org/eng/disc/funds/CT.pdf [hereinafter TRUST FUND STATUS].
160 See Garrison, supra note 157, at 388.
161 TRUST FUND STATUS, supra note 159 (noting that $5,164,821 is due for 2010).
162 See id. (noting that the U.S. paid $1,135,359 for 2009).
163 CITES, TRUST FUND: ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNPAID CONTRIBUTIONS AS OF 30
NOVEMBER 2009 (2009), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/funds/unpaid.pdf
[hereinafter CITES ANNUAL UNPAID CONTRIBUTIONS]. Several more countries have not
paid in the last five years. Id.
164 Id. (noting that Iran has not paid anything since 1999). It is worse when you consider
that Iran is actually responsible for twenty-five percent of the debt excluding unpaid
contributions for 2009. Id. (noting that the total unpaid contributions is $5,196,162, but
only $195,899 is unpaid from 1992–2008).
165 See Standing Comm. Doc. 12.1, 50th Meeting para. 9 (2004), available at http://www
.cites.org/eng/com/sc/50/E50-12-1.pdf.
166 Garrison, supra note 157, at 388.
167 See Standing Comm. Doc. 12.1, supra note 165, at para. 4 (noting that “[i]n spite of the
above measures 79 CITES Parties fell into arrears with their contributions over the period
1992–2003.”).
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contributions as far as possible during the year prior to the one to which
they relate . . . [and] . . . appeals strongly to those Parties which, for legal
or other reasons, have so far been unable to contribute to the Trust Fund
to do so.”168 The Secretariat has very little other significant power to force
countries to meet their financial obligations.169
The amount of external funding, funds which are donated both by
member states and NGOs, has also decreased over the last couple of years.
In 2006, $3,052,021 was donated to supplement the Trust Fund; but in
2007, less than half, about $1,094,710, was donated, and in 2008, only
$565,190 total was donated.170 The rapid decline may be caused, in part,
by the EU’s missing donation. In 2006, the EU donated $1,939,947 and
did not donate anything in 2007 or 2008.171 In 2007, the EU implemented
the EU Action Plan, and it is likely that the EU is using that money to
finance its own programs.172 It is also possible that the countries are
annoyed that others are not receiving any measurable benefit from the
donations, since most of the fund is used to cover the administrative costs
of the treaty.173 Whatever the reason, there is evidence that member states
are hesitant to give more money to CITES as it currently exists.
Although apparently the thought of giving extra money to CITES
is daunting for some countries, more financially stable countries have made
technological advancements that could be made available to third world
countries. “For example, the United Kingdom, a major port of entry for con-
traband endangered wildlife, has created a National Wildlife Crime Unit.
These types of units also exist in India, Namibia, the Russian Federation,
South Africa, Taiwan, and the United States, where they have generally
168 CITES res. 13.1, 13th Conf. (2004), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/13/13-01
.shtml#table (emphasis added).
169 Garrison, supra note 157, at 388; see infra Part IV.D (discussion of CITES enforcement
powers).
170 CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA,
2008 EXTERNAL FUNDS, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/funds/EF2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008
EXTERNAL FUNDS]; CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA
AND FLORA, 2007 EXTERNAL FUNDS, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/funds/EF2007.pdf [herein-
after 2007 EXTERNAL FUNDS]; CONVENTION ON INT’L TRADE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OF
WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, 2006 EXTERNAL FUNDS, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/funds/
EF2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 EXTERNAL FUNDS].
171 2008 EXTERNAL FUNDS, supra note 170; 2007 EXTERNAL FUNDS, supra note 170; 2006
EXTERNAL FUNDS, supra note 170. The EU’s donation, however, does not fully explain the
multi-million dollar decline from 2007–2008.
172 See EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. II(h)–(i), (m), II(b).
173 Garrison, supra note 157, at 388. CITES has considered ways to leave more of the Trust
Fund to finance programs. See Standing Comm. Doc. 12.1, supra note 165, at paras. 16–18,
30–32 (discussing ways to decrease administrative costs).
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had great success.”174 Several countries have successfully employed dog
sniffer programs to help combat wildlife crime.175 Since the conventions
only meet every few years, a database similar to the EU-Twix would allow
countries to easily share information and resources.176
The EU Action Plan specifically calls for the sharing of technology,
information, and resources between member states.177 The financial and
subsidiary assistance to other member states, especially in developing
countries, is required in order to ensure that all enforcement agencies are
adequately funded and provided with the necessary technology, expertise,
information, and staff to enforce wildlife policies.178 There is precedent,
therefore, for the sharing of funds and resources present in the EU that
could be spread outside Europe.
First, CITES needs more funding to help countries effectively com-
bat wildlife crime. Any cooperative must include a fund specifically for
helping countries pay for the incremental costs of the wildlife policies.
The Convention on Biological Diversity179 has a similar fund called the
Special Voluntary Trust Fund.180 This is a voluntary fund that is specifi-
cally set up to provide funds for countries to implement programs specific
to the Convention.181 Countries have been more generous to this fund than
174 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682.
175 Jyoti Kamal, Govt to Use Sniffer Dogs to Curb Illegal Wildlife Trade, CNN, Nov. 7, 2008,
available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/govt-to-use-sniffer-dogs-to-curb-illegal-wildlife-trade/
77648-3.html (India); Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1682 (South Korea); Endangered
Wildlife Trust—TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa Activities, https://www.ewt.org.za/
workgroups_overview.aspx?group=traffic&page=activities&morePage=activities_more
&activity=4 (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (Kenya); Stuart Winter, Battle to Halt Menace
of Deadly Bushmeat Trade, SUNDAY EXPRESS, Oct. 31, 2004, available at http://www
.sovereignty.org.uk/features/footnmouth/bushmeat.html (United Kingdom).
176 See CITES, supra note 6, at art. 11(2); supra text accompanying notes 144–49.
177 EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. III(d), (h)–(i); see also ENGER & PARRY-JONES,
supra note 119, at 42 (the TRAFFIC report that recommended information and resource
sharing in EU).
178 EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. II(b); OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT, supra note 119,
at 42.
179 The Convention on Biological Diversity is a treaty “signed by 150 government leaders
at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit [and] . . . is dedicated to promoting sustainable develop-
ment.” Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/convention/ (last visited
Jan. 19, 2009). See generally United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 5,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml [herein-
after CBD].
180 CBD—Status of Contributions, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/contributions
.shtml?tab=0 (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
181 Garrison, supra note 157, at 388 (“Unlike the Convention on Biological Diversity,
which has a funding mechanism designed to assist Parties in implementing sustainable
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to CITES’ external funding program; in 2009, this fund had $6,119,573
pledged,182 while CITES’ external funding for 2008 was only $565,190.183
One possible reason that countries have been more willing to donate money
to the CBD fund over the CITES fund is that the money goes to directly
help countries implement programs.184 A funding regime similar to the
CBD’s voluntary fund should be implemented—this fund would still be
supplemented by donations and should, theoretically, be as successful as
the CBD voluntary fund. This fund would help poorer countries as promul-
gated by the EU Action Plan and, in turn, help more effectively combat
wildlife crime all over the world.
Secondly, CITES must be able to penalize countries for refusing to
pay their dues. The Secretariat has argued that countries are not paying
because of politics and not because they cannot afford to pay the dues.185
This willful noncompliance cannot be allowed to go on.186 Moreover, if the
member states paid the dues in full, it is possible that the Convention
would have money in excess of administrative costs to better finance pro-
grams and policies,187 such as instructive training manuals for enforcement
officials.188 CITES should also strongly consider requiring countries to pay
more than the U.N. assessment amount.189 CITES cannot be expected to
make gold from wood; in order to effectively combat wildlife crime, CITES
must have the necessary resources to reasonably accomplish this.
use projects at the national level, CITES’ trust fund only covers CITES administrative
operations.”); CBD—Status of Contributions, supra note 180.
182 Voluntary Contributions under the Convention on Biological Diversity for 2008, http://
www.cbd.int/convention/parties/contributions.shtml?tab=4 (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
And this is without a contribution from the U.S. Id.
183 2008 EXTERNAL FUNDS, supra note 170.
184 CBD—Status of Contributions, supra note 180; Garrison, supra note 157, at 388.
185 See CITES Standing Comm. Doc. 12.1, supra note 165, para. 9.
186 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.D.
187 As it stands, the administrative costs of the convention, including travel expenditures,
payment for experts, technology requirements, etc., barely covers the amount of money
received from the trust fund. CITES Doc. No. 8.1, 13th Conf. 1 (2004), available at http://
www.cites.org/eng/cop/13/doc/E13-08-1.pdf. “The expenditures in 2002 amounted to CHF
8.70 million [~5.5 million USD], which is 98 percent of the budget of CHF 8.92 million
[~5.65 million USD] approved by the Conference of the Parties.” Id.
188 Id. at 1 (identification manuals in budget). CITES has interactive training materials
for enforcement officers available through their website. CITES Publications, http://www
.cites.org/eng/resources/publications.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
189 This was already discussed as a possibility in 2004, but was not adopted. CITES
Standing Comm. Doc. No. 12.1, supra note 165, paras. 22–25. They discussed raising the
minimum dues from .001% of the total budget to .01% for the least developed countries.
Id. at para 23–24.
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Countries may plead poverty when asked to step up enforcement
of wildlife crime, especially considering the current economic situation.
Spain, for example, has done just this, advocating economic growth and
stimulus at the expense of environmental concerns.190 Spain has pushed
public works projects, such as highway building, regardless of the damag-
ing effect such projects may have on sensitive environmental areas.191
It is possible, however, to have an economic package while still
being sensitive to environmental concerns. The recently passed stimulus
package in the United States, for example, includes many environmental
initiatives including $32.80 billion in clean energy projects, $26.86 billion
in energy efficient projects, and $18.95 billion for eco-friendly transporta-
tion initiatives.192 Additionally, the U.S. package shows that it is possible
to still be concerned about environmental issues even in the face of a seri-
ous economic downturn.193 As such, pleading poverty is not necessarily
a compelling argument for a lack of environmental regulation, including
a lack of oversight regarding illegal wildlife trafficking.
CITES should require member states to be more cooperative and
share resources to more effectively combat wildlife crime, as witnessed in
the EU Action Plan. Secondly, CITES needs to raise more money to help
countries reasonably implement the policies enacted by the convention.
Lastly, CITES must begin to penalize countries for refusing to supplement
the Trust Fund. And although the poor economy is an easy scapegoat for
member states to rely on, it does not give countries permission to forego
their environmental responsibilities.
B. Require More Rigorous Culpability Standards
First, in order to help the laws be successful, the culpability require-
ment for a conviction under these laws should include some form of strict
liability.194 Although there is no example of an unconditional standard of
190 See Richard Weynalding, Wildlife Risks Paying the Price for Economic Gloom, ENDS
EUROPE, Feb. 11, 2009 (on file with author).
191 See id.
192 Sarah Karlin, What Will It Take to Implement a Green Jobs Agenda?, CELSIAS, http://
www.celsias.com/article/what-will-it-take-implement-green-jobs-agenda/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2010).
193 See Larry West, Obama Signs “Green” Economic Stimulus Package, ABOUT.COM, Feb. 17,
2009, available at http://environment.about.com/b/2009/02/17/obama-signs-green-economic
-stimulus-package.htm.
194 For a general discussion of having strict liability culpability in animal trafficking laws
see Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679 and Kazmar, supra note 9, at 120–23.
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strict liability for the crimes, there is international precedent of more
rigorous culpability standards for both cybercrimes and wildlife crimes.
Any new international cooperative should stipulate more severe liability
policies to act as a deterrent for wildlife crime, both on the internet or in
the traditional market.
If we do not require strict liability under the law, many wildlife
criminals will be able to escape prosecution by arguing an innocent mind.195
This is especially risky in online transactions. For example, even though
eBay has a policy outlawing the sale of elephant ivory, there are still many
solicitors on the website purporting to sell elephant ivory.196 A seller could
theoretically escape prosecution by arguing that he thought the ivory was
antique or did not know it was real elephant ivory.197 An international law
stipulating strict liability, or a culpability standard similar to strict liability,
would mitigate that possibility. It would also be easier for the government
to prosecute these individuals if they do not have to prove mens rea.198
Some countries, however, have rejected blanket applications of strict
liability in favor of a more limited strict liability. Victoria, Australia, for
example, enacted a strict liability offense of computer trespass in 1988.199
Australia, however, eventually repealed this statute because it posed a risk
of over-criminalization200 and passed the Cybercrime Act of 2001.201 This
act relies on either intent or recklessness for liability for most crimes.202
Some crimes, such as ones involving government computers and informa-
tion or telecommunications services, however, dictate absolute liability.203
In the instant case, a limited form of strict liability could be applied for
only the most egregious violations of wildlife crime, such as appendix I vio-
lations. The Australian law, while offering proof that pure strict liability
195 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679.
196 See supra note 78 (author’s search on eBay for elephant ivory); Greenemeier, supra
note 61 (critic’s search on eBay for elephant ivory).
197 This would be especially true if there was no documentation present or the sale purports
to be authentic elephant ivory.
198 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679.
199 Victoria Crimes (Computer) Act of 1988, 1988, sec. 9A (Austl.) (“A person must not
gain access to, or enter, a computer system, or part of a computer system without lawful
authority.”); Simon Bronitt & Miriam Gani, Cyber-crime in the 21st Century: Windows on
Australian Law, in CYBER-CRIME: THE CHALLENGE IN ASIA 147 (Roderic G. Broadhurst &
Peter N. Grabosky eds., 2005).
200 Bronitt & Gani, supra note 199, at 147–49.
201 The Cybercrime Act of 2001, 2001 (Austl.); see Bronitt & Gani, supra note 199, at 149–54.
202 Bronitt & Gani, supra note 199, at 151–52, tbl.8.2.
203 The Cybercrime Act of 2001 § 477.2(d) (Austl).
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clauses are frowned upon, does offer precedent for a more stringent cul-
pability standard for cybercrimes.
There is precedent in the United States supporting strict liability
in wildlife crimes, albeit on a limited scale. Many U.S. wildlife laws already
require strict liability.204 For example, the U.S. Lacey Act requires strict
liability in cases where anyone who knows, or in the exercise of due care
should know, that the wildlife was illegally sold or transported.205 If the gov-
ernment could not prove the requisite state of mind, the accused would be
convicted of a misdemeanor instead of a felony.206 This partial form of strict
liability could be the best of both worlds: offering harsher penalties for
intentional wildlife crimes, but also punishing the incidental crimes.207
There is international acceptance of more rigorous mens rea re-
quirements specifically for cybercrimes. The Commonwealth of Nations’208
Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime,209 included the
concept of reckless liability in their criminal code.210 The Model Code
reaches further than the Convention on Cybercrime in this respect211 and
allows for easier prosecutions of cybercrimes. Reckless liability is a better
requirement for wildlife crimes, because it encourages persons to think
204 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679 n.180 (citing Kazmar, supra note 9, at 120).
205 Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3373(a) (2006) (“It is unlawful for any person . . . to import . . .
wildlife . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law.”). See Robert S.
Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife
Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 61 n.240 (1995) (“Congress intended the common
law definition of ‘due care’ to apply” to Lacey Act prosecutions). For further discussion
of the Lacey Act’s culpability requirements, see id. at 61–62; Zimmerman, supra note 9,
at 1679 (discussing the possibility of including a standard close to strict liability, but not
quite as stringent); Kazmar, supra note 9, at 121–22.
206 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d) (2006). See also Anderson, supra note 205, at 61.
207 See Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679; Kazmar, supra note 9, at 121–22.
208 The Commonwealth of Nations is comprised of fifty-four countries “work[ing] together
toward international goals.” Commonwealth of Nations, Introducing the Commonwealth,
http://www.commonwealth-of-nations.org/article.php?id=2&subsection=2 (last visited
Mar. 16, 2010).
209 MODEL LAW ON COMPUTER AND COMPUTER RELATED CRIME (2002) (Commonwealth of
Nations), available at http://www.ictparliament.org/index.php/component/legislationlibrary/
?task=view&id=307&catid=303.
210 Id. at pt. 2, para. 6(1). For example, a person could be liable for interfering with data
if she “intentionally or recklessly, without lawful excuse or justification” destroys or alters
data. Id. at pt. 2, para.(6)(1)(a).
211 Xingan Li, International Actions against Cybercrime: Networking Legal Systems in the
Networked Crime Scene, 4(3) WEBOLOGY (2007), http://www.webology.ir/2007/v4n3/a45
.html. “[T]he Commonwealth’s model law represents a breakthrough in extending criminal
liability to the mens rea of offences of interfering with data, interfering with computer
systems, and illegal devices so as to include reckless liability.” Id.
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critically and do their research before buying or selling animals online.
For example, a person may be recklessly liable for selling a seahorse, or
any other animal online, without the required paperwork.212 This standard
would also protect the completely “innocent” buyer who receives forged
documents or receives wrong information that the some government
seemed to want to prevent.
Currently, in many “CITES member states, the degree of the
defendant’s knowledge regarding the illegally obtained wildlife is not
considered, making it difficult to distinguish a felony-like crime from a
misdemeanor-like crime.”213 Although it may not be feasible for all wild-
life crimes to require strict liability, it is not unreasonable to extend a
conditional strict liability requirement to international wildlife laws. If
the countries would not agree to a full strict liability requirement for all
crimes, then a conditional requirement could be employed. A combination
of reckless liability and strict liability standards would protect both the
completely innocent or duped buyer, but also deter buyers and sellers from
carelessly engaging in wildlife trade, especially over the internet. This
way, more wildlife criminals could be prosecuted and this would send a
clear message to all potential wildlife offenders.214 In order to deter future
wildlife criminals and to punish any careless criminals and advance CITES’
enforcement goals, any international wildlife cybercrime cooperative should
contain a more rigorous culpability standard.
C. International Harmonization of Wildlife Laws
Evidence has shown that wildlife criminals are relying more on the
internet to commit crimes.215 Now that animal trafficking has evolved into
a cybercrime, wildlife legislation must change to reflect this. Cybercrimes
cannot be fought exclusively on a local front since cybercrimes are often
transnational.216 The goals of international harmonization of cybercrime
legislation, as evidenced in the Convention on Cybercrime, and wildlife
legislation, as seen in the EU Action Plan, must be implemented in CITES.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 80–83 for examples of online sales of seahorses.
213 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679; see also Kazmar, supra note 9, at 121 (citing Nepal,
Panama, and Chile as examples of States that do not consider a defendant’s knowledge).
214 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1679.
215 CAUGHT IN THE WEB, supra note 11, at ii (“The Internet is coming to play a central role
in the activities of illegal traders.”).
216 Susan W. Brenner, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, in CYBERCRIME:
DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 218 (Jack M. Balkin et al. eds., 2007).
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Presently, CITES requires signatory countries to enact national
legislation consistent with CITES, but the inconsistency between policies
among the different states is cause for concern. Because CITES has no
overarching authority, each state must enact its own laws.217 This means
that many of the policies have radically different penalties, thereby allow-
ing traders to choose the most lenient country to commit the act in.218
Now that animal trafficking is being perpetrated online, it is even more
likely that the crime is transnational.219 In order to fight animal trafficking
effectively, the fight must be a global one.
Using the principles of the Convention on Cybercrime, CITES
should encourage more international cooperation between parties. CITES
should require member states to define certain wildlife trades as crimes
as the Convention does.220 This will ensure a “baseline of consistency” for
wildlife crimes that the Convention on Cybercrime attempts to achieve.221
It may be advisable to create “model legislation” for countries to refer to
when drafting their own laws that would not necessarily be compulsory.222
Additionally, an extradition policy modeled after the Convention
on Cybercrime should be included in the new CITES policies. CITES, by
not having an extradition policy, hampers the enforcement of wildlife laws.
CITES should specifically allow for extradition of cross-border criminals223
for the most severe wildlife crimes dictated.224 Extradition agreements are
necessary because so many wildlife crimes are transnational.225
The new provisions would only necessitate a bare minimum of
legislation that would not likely interfere with national sovereignty or
217 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1680; Kazmar, supra note 9, at 113.
218 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1680 (“This not only defeats the purpose of combating
organized crime in the illegal wildlife trade, but encourages the continuous spread of
organized crime because groups will keep moving to and operating from countries that
do not have adequate wildlife criminal legislation or extradition policies.”).
219 See Brenner, supra note 216, at 209.
220 See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at arts. 2–9.
221 Brenner, supra note 216, at 211.
222 The Convention on Cybercrime does not take this step and is criticized for it. See id.
at 212.
223 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1680–81.
224 This is similar to the Convention on Cybercrime’s requirement that extradition be
allowed only for the most severe crimes in the treaty. Convention on Cybercrime, supra
note 13, at art. 24, para. 1.
225 See Message to Senate Transmitting the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
supra note 102 (noting that “As such, it would help deny ‘safe havens’ to criminals . . .
who can cause damage to U.S. interests from abroad using computer systems.”); see also
Brenner, supra note 216, at 209 (discussing the “safe haven” problem).
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privacy rights. Many critics of the Convention on Cybercrime would likely
criticize this proposal.226 The safeguards the Convention employs would
need to be implemented in the new CITES legislation.227 CITES would need
to have an opt-out similar to the Convention, which would allow countries
to refuse to sign on to certain resolutions if there are constitutional, sov-
ereign, or privacy concerns.228 As earlier discussed, there is no indication
that the Convention on Cybercrime will lead to blatant constitutional
problems,229 and there is no indication that this will be any different for
the proposed CITES changes.
The EU Action Plan is indicative of the type of international coop-
eration that is needed to combat the illegal animal trade. The EU Action
Plan specifically requires the cooperation between states by sharing re-
sources and information.230 An intranet, similar to EU-TWIX, would be a
very beneficial tool to have and utilize globally. Since CITES conventions
are only every two years or so, the intranet would allow for a more frequent
form of communication and assistance between countries.231 Although the
EU is a small body of countries as compared to CITES, the principles
employed by the EU Action Plan can easily be utilized on a larger scale.
Although the Convention on Cybercrime and the EU Action Plan
are both in their infancy and their success is not altogether known, the
principles of harmonization and cooperation can be developed in new
CITES legislation to increase the effectiveness of the treaty. As animal
trafficking has become a more lucrative and transnational crime, it has
become clear that a global initiative is needed. CITES needs to adapt to
the evolution of wildlife crimes or face a losing battle.
D. Let CITES Carry a “Big Stick”: Bolstering of CITES’ Authority
President Theodore Roosevelt often explained his foreign policy
attitude as “speak softly and carry a big stick.”232 CITES, in order to be
226 See supra notes 106–18 and accompanying text describing the critics to the Convention
on Cybercrime.
227 See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at art. 27; supra notes 113–18 and
accompanying text.
228 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 13, at art. 27.
229 See supra text accompanying note 118.
230 See EU Action Plan, supra note 16, at para. III.
231 See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text describing the EU-TWIX and its benefits.
232 NATHAN MILLER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A LIFE 337 (New York 1992). The quote is a
West African Proverb President Roosevelt was fond of. Id.
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effective, must employ the same principle. CITES, a non-binding agree-
ment by nature,233 has had an abysmal track record ensuring member
states’ compliance with its policies and must be able to effectively
enforce policies.234
CITES has little or no authority to ensure member states’ compli-
ance with the treaty. CITES has, by its own admission, had problems with
non-compliance.235 Countries have failed to supplement the trust fund,236
prepare annual reports on time,237 and to create appropriate national
legislation consistent with CITES.238 Some member parties continually
allow “significant trade” of CITES-listed animals.239 This persistent non-
compliance essentially inhibits the effectiveness of CITES. Presently, the
Secretariat lacks the authentic ability to sanction the member states which
fail to meet their CITES obligations.240
Although the Parties at the Conference of Parties in 2007passed
a resolution concerning the compliance of the treaty,241 it gives the Secre-
tariat very little real power. The resolution allows the Standing Committee
to recommend the suspension of trade in specimens of one or more CITES-
listed species if the non-compliance is persistent.242 Although twenty-one
member states have been recommended for trade suspension,243 there is
no evidence that any of the other countries have actually refused to trade
with the negligent country.244 The resolution also does not include any form
233 Kazmar, supra note 9, at 113 (“CITES mainly serves as an international coordinating
instrument.”).
234 Rosalind Reeve, Wildlife Trade, Sanctions and compliance: Lessons from the CITES
Regime, 82 INT’L AFFAIRS 88, 884–85 (2006).
235 See CITES res. 14.3, 14th Conf. (2007), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/14/14-
03.shtml (discussing ways to better facilitate compliance of policies).
236 See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text for further discussion.
237 Kazmar, supra note 9, at 112.
238 Id. at 112–13.
239 See Countries Currently Subject to a Recommendation to Suspend Trade, http://www
.cites.org/eng/news/sundry/trade_suspension.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2009) (noting
the countries subject to a trade suspension because of their continued allowance of trade
in CITES-listed animals).
240 Kazmar, supra note 9, at 113; Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1667.
241 See CITES res. 14.3, supra note 235.
242 Id. at para. 30.
243 Countries Currently Subject to a Recommendation to Suspend Trade, supra note 239
(noting that twenty-five countries are subject to the recommendation, although only twenty-
one are parties to the treaty). The reasons for suspension are varied, such as lack of
national legislation, failing to produce annual reports, and trade of prohibited animals. Id.
244 Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1667. “Trade sanctions generally recommend that member
states temporarily suspend wildlife trade with countries that are in noncompliance with
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of financial penalty as earlier discussed by the Standing Committee.245
This resolution is admittedly a non-binding legal “guide” only and has
little power to actually sanction anyone246 and has not been an effective
deterrent for countries.247 Without actual power, the Secretariat has little
choice, but to depend on the good graces of the country to comply with the
sanctioned trade restrictions. Although this resolution is a good begin-
ning, a more resolute sanctioning policy must be enacted to actually curb
non-compliance.
CITES’ purpose must be fundamentally changed to realistically
bolster its authoritative power. CITES, as it currently stands, is little more
than a guideline.248 CITES’ resolutions must no longer be “non-binding”
guidelines, but must have the effect of law. Such penalties could include
the institution of fines,249 trade restrictions as already agreed to, and the
inability to participate in decision-making at the Conference of Parties.
This would allow CITES to properly sanction a country’s non-compliance,
which would act as a real deterrent.
Although countries may object to the swift sanctioning power of
CITES,250 the changes from present resolutions would be relatively minor.
CITES. . . . [However,] no part of the treaty binds member states to act on recommen-
dations. . . .” Id. at 1666–67 (emphasis added).
245 See Standing Comm. Doc. 12.1, supra note 165, at para. 8(b) (“Financial penalty (ineligi-
bility of a Party to have its participation in a meeting of the Conference of the Parties
funded by the Convention, ineligibility of a Party to receive other financial assistance from
the Convention).”); see CITES res. 14.3, supra note 235.
Some recommend fining countries that violate the provisions of the treaty. Compare
Terrence L. Lavy, Extradition in the Protection of Endangered Species, 4 CRIM. L.F. 443,
456 (1993) (recommending financial penalties), with Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1686
(arguing that financial penalties will not work). Many of the countries that are unable
to adequately comply with CITES are developing countries that likely could not pay the
fines. Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1686.
246 CITES res. 14.3, supra note 235, at para. 1.
247 This is evidenced by the eighty-seven countries that have still not paid their dues for
2009 to the tune of $367,716 even after the passage of the resolution. CITES ANNUAL
UNPAID CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 163. Also, $71,069 is still due for 2008. Id.
248 See Kazmar, supra note 9, at 112–13.
249 Large financial penalties are not necessary, but a nominal fine may still send the mes-
sage. Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1686 (noting specifically that “significant” fines may
not work).
250 It is important to note that similar international sanctioning powers exist in the UN.
For example, the United Nations (U.N.) recently imposed serious sanctions on Iran for
violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161,
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf;
Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, S.C. Doc. No.
2010] PC PETS FOR A PRICE 997
Member states, by passing resolutions on compliance measures, have
acknowledged the problem and agreed to the possibility of trade restric-
tions and have considered financial penalties in the past. Countries simply
would be held responsible for their commitments to the protection of wild-
life. CITES must have a way to ensure compliance or the fight against
animal trafficking will inevitably fail.
CONCLUSION
As the third largest illegal business in the world,251 one that is
growing at an astonishing rate,252 animal trafficking deserves more atten-
tion than it has been given to date. Although efforts such as CITES are
commendable, they are largely ineffective because they bow to concerns of
national sovereignty.253 By allowing its members to make their own rules,
CITES renders itself toothless. The unification of wildlife legislation, in-
cluding culpability requirements, is essential to the successful combat of
wildlife crime.
CITES amounts to little more than a symbolic gesture and a warn-
ing not to traffic in animals. The necessary solution to illegal animal traf-
ficking is to bolster CITES and increase its power to enforce regulations.254
It is time for the world to take responsibility for protecting wildlife and
give CITES the power it needs to be effective.
The growing use of the internet in wildlife trafficking necessitates
a global response and harmonization is needed to effectively combat wild-
life crime. Because wildlife crime is a global crime, international coopera-
tion is essential. CITES should draft model legislation or specific policies
for member states to adopt.255 Consistency between national legislation
is necessary to ensure that criminals are not using lenient countries as
“safe havens” to commit animal trafficking.256 A more rigorous culpability
8980, ¶¶ 1–3 (Mar. 24, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980
.doc.htm. Although wildlife trafficking is not as grievous as nuclear proliferation, the treaty,
and other UN sanctions, are precedent for this type of international sanctioning.
251 Giovanni, supra note 1, at 25.
252 Joonmoo Lee, Poachers, Tigers and Bears . . . Oh my! Asia’s Illegal Wildlife Trade, 16
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 497, 497 (1996).
253 This is because CITES allows parties to draft their own national policies rather than
providing model legislation or implementing its own policies. See Kazmar, supra note 9,
at 110–13; Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 1665–66.
254 See supra Part IV.D.
255 See supra Part IV.C.
256 See Brenner, supra note 216, at 209 (discussing the problem of “safe havens”); see also
Message to Senate Transmitting the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, supra
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standard for online wildlife crimes in the new legislation is essential, be-
cause it is easy for a criminal to feign ignorance of the laws.257 This would
force the buyer or seller to take, at the very least, minimal precautions
before engaging in online wildlife transactions.
Funds, technology, and resources must be shared to ensure that
criminals do not have a haven to commit wildlife crimes.258 There is prec-
edent of this ideal cooperation seen in the EU Action Plan.259 Countries
must make the fight against wildlife crime a priority and pony up the
resources necessary to sustain the fight in order for the overexploitation
of wildlife to be curbed. Only when the world takes responsibility for the
environment as a whole will environmental sustainability and stability
be achieved.
note 102 (noting the importance of the Convention of Cybercrime to combat transnational
computer crimes).
257 See supra notes 195–97 for further discussion.
258 See supra Part IV.A.
259 See supra Part III.
